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JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
§78A-3-102(3)(j). Appellate jurisdiction for this case can be found at Utah Code 
Annotated §78B-ll-129(i)(a). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
The Appellate presents two issues for review. Both issues are closely related 
with identical standard of review. 
Issue 1. Did the District Court err by not compelling arbitration for the 
following issue: 
Did the UTA breach its duty to collectively bargain a successor 
agreement with the Union and wrongfully declare an impasse in 
negotiations and unilaterally implement terms and conditions of 
employment in violation of the 13(c) Arrangement and the 
collective bargaining rights it protects under applicable laws, 
policies and agreement? If so, what is the remedy? 
Issue 2. Are the allegations; that the UTA breached its duty to 
collectively bargain a successor agreement with the Union, declared 
wrongfully an impasse in negotiations, and implemented wrongfully 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
{ 
unilateral terms and conditions of employment; subject to arbitration 
pursuant to the parties' Section 13(c) Protective Arrangement? 
Standard of Review. The District Court's denial of a Motion to Compel 
Arbitration and interpretation of an agreement to arbitrate presents a question of law 
which the appellate courts review for correctness. Sosa v. Paulos, 924 P.2d 357 
(Utah 1996), and Jenkins v. Peraval 962 P.2d 796 (Utah 1988). 
Issue Preservation. Both issues were preserved at the trial court by the 
Appellant filing its initial motion to compel arbitration (R. 62-63) and by the 
subsequent presentation of argument. (R. 12-64). 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statutes are subject to interpretation by this court with this 
appeal: 
Utah Code Annotated §17B-2a-813(l) and (2) which reads as follows: 
(1) The rights, benefits, and other employee protective 
conditions and remedies of Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass 
Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 5333(b), as 
determined by the Secretary of Labor, apply to a public transit 
district's establishment and operation of a public transit service 
or system. 
(2) (a) Employees of a public transit system established and 
operated by a public transit district have the right to: 
2 
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(i) self-organization; 
(ii) form, join, or assist labor organizations; and 
(iii) bargain collectively through representatives of 
their own choosing. 
(b) Employees of a public transit district and labor 
organizations may not join in a strike against the public transit 
system operated by the public transit district. 
(c) Each public transit district shall: 
(i) recognize and bargain exclusively with any 
labor organization representing a majority of the 
district's employees in an appropriate unit with 
respect to wages, salaries, hours, working 
conditions, and welfare, pension, and retirement 
provisions; and 
(ii) upon reaching agreement with the labor 
organization, enter into an execute a written 
contract incorporating the agreement. 
Utah Code Annotated §78B-11-107(1) and (2) which reads as follows: 
(1) An agreement contained in a record to submit to arbitration 
any existing or subsequent controversy arising between the 
parties to the agreement is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable 
except upon a ground that exists at law or in equity for the 
revocation of a contract. 
(2) The court shall decide whether an agreement to arbitrate 
exists or a controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Appellee Utah Transit Authority (hereinafter "UTA") is a Utah public transit 
district. Appellant Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union (hereinafter 
3 
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"Union") is the exclusive bargaining representative for UTA operations, parts, and 
maintenance employees. During the course of negotiating a new collective 
bargaining agreement between the UTA and the Union, in the latter half of 2009, 
certain labor disputes arose between the UTA and the Union which the Union grieved 
and sought to arbitrate. On April 23, 2010, the UTA filed a complaint for declaratory 
relief requesting that the District Court decree (1) that certain labor disputes between 
the Union and the UTA are not arbitrable and (2) that the court determine whether or 
not the parties were at an impasse in their negotiations on December 21, 2009. (R. 1-
6). 
The Union responded with a Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay the 
Judicial Proceeding. (R. 62-64). Shortly thereafter, the UTA filed its Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment requesting that the Court hold that the labor disputes 
between the parties were not arbitrable. (R. 65-67). The motions were fully briefed 
and a hearing was held before the trial court on July 9, 2010. The Court took the 
matter under advisement. (R. 186). 
On September 8, 2010, the Court rendered the decision denying the Union's 
Motion to Compel Arbitration and granted the UTA's Motion for Partial Summary 
Judgment. (R. 189-195). Pursuant to Rule 59, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and on 
September 16, 2010, the Union filed a Motion to Amend the Court's Ruling. (R. 196-
4 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
198). The Court held a hearing on Motion to Amend on November 1, 2010. At the 
hearing, the parties made joint recommendations on how the Court's Ruling should 
be amended. The Court accepted the recommendations and an Amended Ruling was 
entered on November 9, 2010. (R. 219-223). An appeal to this Court was filed on 
November 23, 2010. (R. 224-226). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The UTA is a Utah public transit district within the meaning of the Public 
Transit District Act, U.C.A. §§17B-2a-801, et seq. It operates in several Utah 
counties along the Wasatch Front. The UTA's headquarters are in Salt Lake County. 
(R. 190). 
The Union is an unincorporated association with its principal office in Salt 
Lake County. Pursuant to U.C.A. § 17B-2-813(2)(b)(i), the UTA has recognized the 
Union as the exclusive representative for purposes of collective bargaining terms and 
conditions of employment for certain UTA employees. A series of collective 
bargaining agreements (hereinafter "C.B.A.") were negotiated between the UTA and 
5 
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the Union; the last such C.B.A. expired by its term on December 10, 2009, but was 
extended by the parties through December 21, 2009. (R. 190).l 
As a condition of the UTA receiving federal funds, the UTA has been and 
continues to be obligated to honor certain labor protections for the benefit of 
employees represented by the Union, pursuant to Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass 
Transit Act of 1964 (now codified as 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b), known as the Section 
13(c) Arrangement (hereinafter "Arrangement"). (R. 190). Under Section 13(c), the 
United States Department of Labor must ensure that "fair and equitable" 
arrangements are in place in its certifications before the Federal Department of 
Transportation can release federal funds to state transit districts. As indicated in the 
Department of Labor's certifications, these arrangements are made part of the 
contract assistance which is an agreement between the UTA and the United States 
Department of Transportation which is entered into each time the UTA receives 
federal funding. The terms and conditions of the Arrangements are intended for the 
primary and direct benefit of transit employees which here are represented by the 
Union. The employees represented by the Union are, then, intended third-party 
beneficiaries to the employee protective arrangements of the grant contract between 
the Department of Transportation and the UTA and the UTA has and continues to so 
1
 After the commencement of this Appeal, the UTA and the Union entered into a new 
C.B.A. effective April 1,2011. 
6 
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signify by executing the contract of assistance each time it is awarded a federal grant. 
(R. 155). A copy of the relevant portions of the Arrangement is attached at the end of 
this Brief as Appendix "C" (R. 15, 31-43). 
Paragraph 8 of the Arrangement is the arbitration clause which both the UTA 
and the Union seek an interpretation from this Court. The critical paragraph 8(a) 
reads as follows: 
Any labor dispute or controversy between the 
Public Body and any employee represented by the 
Union or between the Public Body [UTA] and the 
Union, regarding the application, interpretation, or 
enforcement of this Arrangement, which cannot be 
settled by the parties within thirty (30) days after 
the dispute or controversy first arises, may be 
submitted at the written request of either the Public 
Body or the Union to a board of arbitration to be 
selected as hereinafter provided. [Emphasis Added] 
(R. 37). 
By reason of the UTA declaring an impasse, refusing to negotiate further and 
imposing new terms and conditions of employment, the Union contended that arbitrable 
labor disputes exist, under paragraph 8(a) regarding the application, interpretation, or 
enforcement of paragraph 3 of the Arrangement. Paragraph 3 of the Arrangement reads 
as follows: 
7 
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The collective bargaining rights of employees 
represented by the Union including the right to 
arbitrate or otherwise resolve labor disputes and to 
maintain check-off arrangements, as provided by 
applicable laws, policies and/or existing collective 
bargaining agreements shall be preserved and 
continued; provided, however, that this provision 
shall not be interpreted so as to require the Public 
Body to retain any such rights which exist by 
virtue of a collective bargaining agreement after 
such agreement is no longer in effect, except (a) as 
may otherwise be required under Federal labor 
policy with respect to the arbitration of grievances 
arising under such agreement, or (b) as may be 
required under applicable law, including Section 
13(c) of the Act, or (c) as may be required under 
paragraph (9) of this Arrangement. The Public 
body [UTA] agrees, that it will bargain collectively 
with the Union or otherwise arrange for the 
continuation of collective bargaining, and that it 
will enter into agreements with the Union or 
arrange for such agreements to be entered into, 
relative to all subjects which are or may be proper 
subjects of collective bargaining. [Emphasis 
Added]. 
(R. 32). The UTA contended that the disputes, regarding impasse and imposing new 
terms and conditions of employment between the UTA and the Union, do not arise 
under the above quoted paragraphs 3 and 8(a) and are not otherwise arbitrable but 
instead arises exclusively under U.C.A. §17-B-2a-813(2) for the court to determine. 
(R. 1-6). 
8 
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These labor disputes involve facts surrounding attempts of the UTA and the 
Union to negotiate the terms and conditions for a successor C.B.A. The parties began 
negotiations for a new C.B.A. in August, 2009 and, between then and December 21, 
2009 met about fourteen (14) times. (R. 220). The Union has alleged that, during the 
negotiation period, the UTA failed to bargain in good faith by engaging in surface 
bargaining, by refusing to provide information, by declaring wrongfully an "impasse", 
and by implementing wrongfully terms and conditions of employment. (R. 124-125). 
On December 4, 2009, the UTA unilaterally discontinued negotiations with the 
Union. On December 21, 2009, the UTA unilaterally declared impasse and imposed 
terms and conditions of employment. (R. 200). The Union alleged that the parties 
were not at impasse, that the UTA had not been bargaining in good faith and that the 
UTA's unilateral imposition of terms and conditions of employment were unfair labor 
practices and violations of the Arrangement. The Union requested that all these issues 
be submitted to arbitration. The UTA agreed to submit to arbitration only the issues 
surrounding whether or not imposing terms and conditions of employment violated 
the Arrangement with respect to the Arrangement's Fact-Finding Provisions as 
contained in paragraph 9. The UTA responded to the other request for arbitration of 
the alleged breach of the duty to bargain issue with a "no" and filed the subject 
complaint on April 23, 2010. (R. 1-6, 53). 
9 
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During the prosecution of the complaint, the parties proceeded with the 
arbitration of the other related issues. (R. 741, P. 4-5). Subsequent to the filing of the 
Notice of Appeal herein, a decision was rendered in the related arbitration. The < 
arbitration award was very favorable to the Union and against the UTA. As a result, 
the Union and the UTA resumed negotiations and entered into a new C.B.A. effective
 ( 
April 1, 2011. (Contemporaneously with the filing of this Brief, the Union has filed a 
Motion to Supplement the Record on Appeal pursuant to Rule 11(h), Utah Rules of 
i 
Appellate Procedures, for purpose of placing the post-appeal facts before this Court.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The UTA and the Union are required by both Utah statute and by a Section 
13(c) Arrangement to collectively bargain over the terms and conditions of 
employment. It is an unfair labor practice for one party to not engage in good faith 
bargaining. Should there be allegations of failure to bargain in good faith, those 
allegations must be resolved by an arbitrator pursuant to the arbitration clause 
contained in the Section 13(c) Arrangement. 
10 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I: THE UTA IS REQUIRED BY CONTRACT 
AND STATUTE TO BARGAIN COLLECTIVELY 
WITH THE UNION. 
There are very few statutes and even fewer cases which codify and describe 
the nature of collective labor relations between the State of Utah and its employees. 
Today, the employees of the UTA are the only public employees in Utah who have the 
statutory rights to unionize and to bargain collectively over their terms and conditions 
of employment. These statutory rights can be found at U.C.A. §17B-2a-813. 
There is only one published case which interprets the above statute (actually, 
the predecessor statute of U.C.A. § 17A-2-1031). That case is Burke, et. al. v. Utah 
Transit Authority, et. al., 462 F. 3d 1253, cert, denied, (10th Circuit, 2006). 
The Burke case involved two UTA employees who worked in the TRAX 
division. These employees alleged that the company-wide bargaining unit at the UTA 
was not an "appropriate" unit under Utah and federal law. So those two TRAX 
employees filed suit against the UTA, the Union, and the U.S. Department of Labor. 
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, in affirming the U.S. District Court for Utah, 
held that the company-wide unit was appropriate under both Utah and federal law. 
Although the resolution of the central dispute in Burke is not helpful toward resolving 
the case at hand, the circuit court of appeal's analysis of the development of Utah 
11 
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i 
labor law for its public transit workers and the relationship of that Utah law to federal 
labor law is incredibly helpful. 
The reason Utah has adopted a different approach to public employee labor 
relations with its public transit district employees is because of Section 13(c) of the 
Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b), which reads, in 
pertinent part, as follows: 
(1) As a condition of financial assistance..., the interests 
of employees affected by the assistance shall be protected 
under arrangements the Secretary of Labor concludes are 
fair and equitable... 
(2) Arrangements.. .shall include provisions that may 
be necessary for -
(A) the preservation of rights, privileges, and benefits 
(including continuation of pension rights and 
benefits) under existing collective bargaining 
agreements or otherwise; 
(B) the continuation of collective bargaining rights; 
(C) the protection of individual employees against a 
worsening of their positions related to 
employment... 
As gleaned from the above language and court cases, the purpose of this section is to 
protect the collective bargaining rights of the employees of public transit districts 
which receive federal funding. 
19. 
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The first significant court interpretation of Section 13(c) occurred in 1982 by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in the case known as Jackson Transit Authority v. Local 
Division 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15 (1982). In the Jackson case, 
the Supreme Court held that the transit union had no federal cause of action against a 
public transit authority for purposes of enforcing the terms and conditions of 
collective bargaining agreements. It is because of the Jackson case and its progeny 
that both UTA and the Union agree that the subject Section 13(c) Arrangement must 
be enforced in Utah courts and using primarily Utah law. 
Although Utah law is primary, that does not mean that federal labor policy 
plays no role. This is because of the next significant court interpretation of Section 
13(c), Amalgamated Transit International Union v. Donovan, 767 F. 2d 939 (D.C., 
1985). In the Donovan case, the State of Georgia had adopted legislation which made 
it impossible for employees of the state transit district to collectively bargain for 
certain economic considerations. When the public transit district requested federal 
funds, the union objected to the Department of Labor claiming that Georgia law 
violated Section 13(c). Despite the objection, the Secretary of Labor, Raymond 
Donovan, certified Georgia law as being "fair and equitable" under Section 13(c). 
The union filed a law suit against Donovan. 
13 
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The Donovan case, in an excellent review of Jackson and federal and state labor 
came to the following conclusions about the meaning of Section 13(c): 
In sum, Congress struck a delicate balance in 
section 13(c). The statute provides that state law should 
govern the labor relations of public transit authorities and 
their employees, but it conditions federal transit aid, in 
part, on the continuation of collective bargaining rights. 
In setting out those rights, Congress chose not to 
incorporate the entire structure and requirements of the 
NLRA into section 13(c), for to do so would force states 
to choose between federal transit aid and their exclusion 
from the coverage of the NLRA. On the other hand, 
Congress made it clear that federal labor policy would 
dictate the substantive meaning of collective bargaining 
for purposes of section 13(c). 'Good faith' bargaining, to 
a point of impasse if necessary, over wages, hours and 
other terms and conditions of employment has always 
been the essence of federally-defined collective 
bargaining rights; indeed, excluding the federal sector, it 
is the almost universally recognized definition of 
collective bargaining in the United States. 
Section 13(c)'s requirement, therefore, that labor 
protective agreements provide for "the continuation of 
collective bargaining rights" means, at a minimum, that 
where employees enjoyed collective bargaining rights 
prior to public acquisition of the transit system, they are 
entitled to be represented in meaningful, "good faith" 
negotiations with their employer over wages, hours and 
other terms and conditions of employment. Collective 
bargaining does not exist if any employer retains the 
power to establish wages, hours and other conditions of 
employment without the consent of the union or without 
at least first bargaining in good faith to impasse over 
disputed mandatory subjects. It is against this standard 
14 
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that we must measure [Georgia's Act and Georgia's 
public transit district's labor protective agreement]. 
767 F. 2d at 950-951. 
To comply with the requirements of Donovan, the Department of Labor 
promulgated rules for the process by which the Secretary of Labor would deem the 
employee protective arrangements as "fair and equitable" pursuant to Section 13(c). 
The rules can be found at 29 CFR § 215. The rules encourage the union and the 
transit body to agree on the employee protective terms that the Department of Labor 
will certify as "fair.and equitable" in a document entitled a Section 13(c) Agreement. 
Should the parties be unable to agree upon such terms, the Department of Labor 
decides what are to be fair and equitable terms and conditions to protect the rights 
afforded to employees under the Section 13(c) statute in a document entitled a Section 
13(c) Arrangement. As discussed above, the Arrangement becomes part of the 
Department of Labor's certification of fair and equitable protections and the contract 
of assistance between the transit body and the U.S. Department of Transportation 
when the transit body received federal funds, and transit body's employees are third-
party beneficiaries of the Arrangement. (R. 155). 
Since September 29, 1993, the UTA, by accepting hundreds of millions of 
dollars in federal aid, has been bound by the Section 13(c) Arrangement which is 
attached to this Brief as Appendix "C". Paragraph 3 of the Arrangement obligates the 
15 
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UTA to bargain collectively with the Union. The pertinent language of paragraph 3 
reads: 
The collective bargaining rights of employees < 
represented by the Union...shall be preserved and 
continued...The Public body [UTA] agrees that it will 
bargain collectively with the Union... and that it [UTA] 
will enter into agreements with the Union.. .relative to all , 
subjects which are or may be proper subjects of 
collective bargaining. 
The UTA entered into the above contract not only to receive federal funding, 
i 
but also to comply with U.C.A. § 17B-2a-813(l), which reads as follows: 
The rights, benefits, and other employee protective 
conditions and remedies of Section 13(c) of the Urban , 
Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 
5333(b), as determined by the Secretary of Labor, apply 
to a public transit district's establishment and operation 
of a public transit service or system. 
As discussed above, the Arrangement is the determination of the Secretary of Labor of 
the "rights, benefits, and other employee protective conditions and remedies of 
Section 13(c)...". U.C.A. § 17B-2a-813(l). 
The UTA's obligation to collectively bargain with the Union is further 
established by the statutory requirement at the UTA collectively bargain with the 
Union. U.C.A. § 17B-2d-813(2)(c)(i) which reads as follows: 
Each public transit district [UTA] shall: (i) recognize 
and bargain exclusively with any labor organization 
representing a majority of the district's employees in an 
16 
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appropriate unit with respect to wages, salaries, hours, 
working conditions, and welfare, pension, and retirement 
provisions; 
The UTA and the Union do not dispute that the UTA has a statutory and 
contractual obligation to engage in collective bargaining with the Union. The dispute 
instead centers around what happens when the Union complains and alleges that the 
UTA is not engaged in good faith collective bargaining. In federal labor law, the 
failure to engage in good faith bargaining is known as an unfair labor practice. 
POINT II: IT IS AN UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICE FOR ONE 
PARTY TO REFUSE TO COLLECTIVELY BARGAIN 
IN GOOD FAITH. 
Utah courts have rarely been asked to resolve collective bargaining disputes. 
This is because, in general, Utah public employees do not have collective bargaining 
rights; and also because the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (hereinafter 
"NLRA"), 29 USC 151-169, preempts state regulation when it comes to determining 
the scope and duty of collective bargaining rights and obligations in the private sector. 
See Building Trades Council (San Diego) v. Garmon, 359 US 236 (1959). 
Accordingly, federal labor laws and policies are well developed. Therefore, it 
is natural to turn to federal law in order to evaluate the duties and obligations of the 
collective bargaining responsibilities of the UTA. Indeed, the federal labor law 
17 
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policies, as argued above, "dictate the substantive meaning of collective bargaining 
for purposes of section 13(c)." Donovan, 767 F. 2d at 950-951. 
Furthermore, by reason of the express wording of U.C.A. § 17B-2a-813(l), < 
Utah has effectively adopted the federal labor policies and protections of the Section 
13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act "as determined by the Secretary of , 
Labor." Further, the UTA does not dispute that the Utah code requires it "to bargain 
in good faith to impasse, if necessary, as stated by the court in Donovan." (R. 78). 
Good faith bargaining entails many things. It is not merely an obligation to 
meet and confer or to go through those motions but has been defined as an 
i 
"obligation.. .[t]o participate actively in the deliberations so as to indicate a present 
intention to find a basis for agreement..." NLRB v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 133 
F2d 676, 686 (CA 9, 1943). Courts and the National Labor Relations Board 
(hereinafter "NLRB") look at the totality of conduct by which the quality of the 
negotiations is tested including factors such as withdrawal of tentative agreements, 
denial of the Union's request for information, good faith dealings, the subjects of 
bargaining (whether they are mandatory, permissible or legal), direct dealings with 
employees, surface bargaining, unilateral changes and imposing conditions. See 
general discussion at Hardin, Patrick (ed.), The Developing Labor Law 5 Ed., 
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Chapter 13, (BNA 2009) and Cox, The Duty To Bargain In Good Faith 71 Harvard 
Law Review 1401, 1413. (1958). 
If the UTA engaged in surface bargaining, precipitously rushed to impasse, and 
imposed the terms and conditions of employment, the UTA may have breached its 
duty to collective bargain for new terms and conditions of employment. 
It has been held that an employer that did not bargain to impasse, cannot 
implement its last offer because it has not engaged in good faith bargaining as 
required by the NLRA. Accurate Die Casting Co., 292 NLRB 982 (1989). Other 
precedent holds that unilateral implementation, in itself, is a strong indication that the 
employer has not engaged in good faith bargaining. NLRB v. Parents & Friends of 
the Specialized Living Center, 879 F. 2d 1442 (CA7, 1979). 
Indeed, a refusal to bargain, by implementing new terms and conditions of 
employment, is considered &per se refusal to bargain and breach of the bargaining 
duty, without even evaluating the subjective good faith of the employer. Justice 
Brennan of the United States Supreme Court wrote in the seminal case of the National 
Labor Relations Board v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736 (1962), as follows: 
The duty to 'bargain collectively' enjoined by § 
8(a)(5) [of the N.L.R.A.] is defined by §8(d) as the 
duty to 'meet***and confer in good faith with 
respect to wages, hours, and other terms and 
conditions of employment.' Clearly, the duty thus 
defined may be violated without a general failure 
19 
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of subjective good faith; for there is no occasion to 
consider the issue of good faith if a party has 
refused even to negotiate in fact - Ho meet***and 
confer' -about any of the mandatory subjects. A 
refusal to negotiate in fact as to any subject which 
is within § 8(d), and about which the union seeks 
to negotiate, violates §8(a)(5) though the employer 
has every desire to reach agreement with the union 
upon an over-all collective agreement and 
earnestly and in all good faith bargains to that end. 
We hold that an employer's unilateral change in 
conditions of employment under negotiation is 
similarly a violation of § 8(a)(5), for it is a 
circumvention of the duty to negotiate which 
frustrates the objectives of § 8(a)(5) much as does 
a flat refusal. 
[Emphasis by italics in original, by underlining 
added, footnotes omitted.] 
369 U.S. 736, 742-743. 
Thus, impasse is but a part of the issue of whether legitimate collective 
bargaining has taken place. In Labors Health and Welfare Trust Fund vs. Advanced 
Lightweight Concrete, 484 U.S. 539 (1988), at footnote 5, the Supreme Court 
observed: 
As the Court of Appeals correctly stated: 
"'Impasse' is an imprecise term of art: 
"The definition of an 'impasse' is understandable 
enough- that point at which the parties have 
exhausted the prospects of concluding an 
agreement and further discussions would be 
fruitless- but its application can be difficult. Given 
?o 
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the many factors commonly itemized by the Board 
and courts in impasse cases, perhaps all that be 
said with confidence is that an impasse is a 'state 
of facts in which the parties, despite the best of 
faith, are simply deadlocked.' The Board and 
courts look to such matters as the number of 
meetings between the company and the union, the 
length of those meetings and the period of time 
that has transpired between the start of 
negotiations and their breaking off. There is no 
magic number of meetings, hours or weeks which 
will reliably determine when an impasse has 
occurred. 
"R. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law: 
Unionization and Collective Bargaining 448 
(1976) (citation omitted)." 779 F. 2d 497, 600, n. 3 
(CA9 1985). 
In footnote 6, the Supreme Court goes on to say: 
Freezing the status quo ante after a collective 
bargaining agreement has expired promotes 
industrial peace by fostering a non-coercive 
atmosphere that is conducive to serious 
negotiations on a new contract. Thus, an 
employer's failure to honor the terms and 
conditions of an expired collective bargaining 
agreement pending negotiations on a new 
agreement constitutes bad faith bargaining in 
breach of sections 8(a)(1), 8(a)(5) and 8(d) of the 
National Labor Relations Act. 
484 U.S. 539, 543-544. 
Reaching a legitimate impasse has been held under the NLRA to entitle an 
employer to unilaterally implement its last and best offer and end the status quo ante 
21 
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of continuing the terms and conditions of the expired agreement. See American Ship 
Building Co. v. NLRB, 380 US 300 (1965). 
However, in the case at hand, an impasse does not allow the UTA, as it had < 
asserted, to change employment terms and conditions, even if it were a legitimate 
impasse under federal labor laws. This is because the Fact-Finding Provisions of the 
Arrangement at Section 9(g) preserve the terms and conditions of the expired C.B.A. 
until the conclusion of fact-finding . UTA incorrectly alleged and argued in effect 
that only "if fact finding is invoked, the terms of the expired collective bargaining 
agreement remain in effect until fact finding is completed. However,...neither the 
UTA nor the Union has invoked fact-finding." (R. 4). 
The Union disputed that fact-finding had to be invoked to preserve the status 
quo. Prior to the Complaint being filed, the Union had sought to arbitrate this labor 
dispute under Section 8 of the Arrangement. The UTA acknowledge it had a duty to 
arbitrate this dispute and agreed to do so "however specious it may be ..." (R. 76). 
The Union's contention turned out not to be specious at all, and it prevailed on 
its position. Arbitrator Axon, in a decision issued subsequent to the Amended Ruling 
of the District Court, held that fact-finding did not have to be invoked by either party 
2
 As Utah transit employees have no right to strike under U.C.A. § 17B-2a-813(b), or no 
right to interest arbitration, fact finding was determined to be the way to settle the inability 
of the parties to negotiate a successor agreement. In effect, it is part of the collective 
bargaining process. 
22 
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for the provisions of the expired contract to remain in force. He ordered they be 
restored retroactive to December 21, 2009 and effective until fact-finding is concluded 
or March 4, 2011. 
In hindsight, it is clear that the actions of the UTA in unilaterally implementing 
new terms and conditions of employment were wrong. It is argued that this unilateral 
action tainted the whole collective bargaining process. The Union contends the UTA 
engaged in surface bargaining and wrongfully declared impasse to justify 
implementation. These are bad faith collective bargaining tactics. 
The above discussion is meant to inform this Court as to the nature of the labor 
disputes for which the Union is seeking an arbitration in resolution on the merits. 
Because Utah courts so rarely deal with labor disputes, the discussion is felt necessary 
to demonstrate that the dispute over impasse which UTA brought before the district 
court, is actually part of the ongoing dispute alleging a breach by the UTA of its 
collective bargaining duties protected by the Arrangement. These labor disputes are 
clearly subject to arbitration under the Arrangement. 
01 
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POINT III: ALLEGATIONS OF UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES 
INVOLVING COLLECTIVE BARGAINING MUST 
BE RESOLVED BY AN ARBITRATOR PURSUANT 
TO THE 13 (C) ARRANGEMENT. 
i 
Pursuant to Section 107 the Utah Uniform Arbitration Act, the district court 
must determine if there is an arbitration agreement covering the disputes before the 
i 
court. If so, the court should compel the parties before the court to arbitrate the 
matters in dispute and stay the judicial proceedings. U.C.A. § 78B-11-108 and ATU 
Local 382 v. UTA, 99 P 3d 379 (Ut. Crt. App. 2004). 
There is clearly an agreement to arbitrate labor disputes and controversies 
regarding the terms of the Arrangement at Section 8(a) of the Protective Arrangement. 
Again this provision states: 
Any labor dispute or controversy between the 
[UTA] and any employee represented by the 
Union or between the [UTA] and the Union, 
regarding the application, interpretation, or 
enforcement of this Arrangement, which cannot be 
settled by the parties within thirty (30) days after 
the dispute or controversy first arises, may be 
submitted at the written request of either the 
[UTA] or the Union to a board of arbitration to be 
settled as hereinafter provided. 
The Arrangement protects, preserves, and continues collective bargaining rights 
of employees established under state law, pursuant to Section 3 of the Arrangement 
which states: 
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The collective bargaining rights of employees 
represented by the Union including the right to 
arbitrate or otherwise resolve labor disputes and to 
maintain check-off arrangements, as provided by 
applicable laws, policies and/or existing 
agreements shall be preserved and 
continued; The Public body [UTA] agrees that 
it will bargain collectively with the Union or 
otherwise arrange for the continuation of collective 
bargaining, and that it will enter into agreement 
with the Union or arrange for such agreements to 
be entered into, relative to all subjects which are or 
may be proper for subjects of collective 
bargaining. [Emphasis added]. 
This is a clear statement of collective bargaining rights and duties protected by 
and subject to the Arrangement. By virtue of the Arrangement and acceptance of 
federal funds, the UTA has agreed that it is the province of a labor arbitrator, not the 
state court, to see whether the rights under the Arrangement, protecting the state law 
of collective bargaining, have been violated. 
While the district court concluded the disputes at issue were not subject to 
arbitration, its basis for doing so is a mystery. The court's decision lacks any 
discussion or explanation as to why the Arrangement's arbitration provisions should 
not be given effect in this instance. 
Nor did the district court explain why Utah's policy favoring arbitration should 
not be determinative of finding the issues are not arbitrable. The Utah Supreme Court 
has directed the district court "to interpret arbitration clauses in a manner that favors 
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arbitration". Docutel Olivetti v. Dick Brady Systems, 731 P 2d 475 at 479, (Utah 
1986), citing Lindon City v. Engineers Construction Co. 636 P 2d 1070 at 1073 (Utah 
1981), quoting King County v. Boeing Co., 18 Wash App 595, 602-03; 570 P 2d 713, 
717(1977): 
[Arbitration is a remedy freely bargained for by 
the parties, and 'provides a means of giving effect 
to the intention of the parried, easing court 
congestion, and providing a method more 
expeditious and less expensive for the resolution of 
disputes 
Arbitration clauses should be liberally interpreted 
when the issue contested is (sic) the scope of the 
clause. If the scope of the clause is debatable or 
reasonably in doubt, the clause should be 
construed in favor of arbitration. 
In Docutel, the Utah Supreme Court found that the contract was not a model of 
clarity, having provisions for separate remedies in arbitration at law. Nonetheless, it 
reversed the District Court and ordered arbitration in keeping with state policy 
favoring arbitration. 
Moreover, arbitration of labor disputes has long been favored under federal law 
as sound public policy. The U.S. Supreme Court's seminal labor law cases under the 
Labor Management Relations Act, known as the Steelworkers Trilogy, have long been 
o ^ 
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precedent for establishing the place of arbitration as the favored national policy as the 
means for settling labor disputes. The court stated: 
...[that courts] have no business weighing 
the merits of the grievance, considering whether 
there is equity in a particular claim, or determining 
whether there is particular language in the written 
instrument which will support the claim. The 
agreement is to submit all grievances to arbitration, 
not merely those the court will deem meritorious. 
The processing of even frivolous claims may have 
therapeutic values which those who are not a part 
of the plant environment may be quite unaware. 
United Steelworkers of America v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 US 564, 568, 
46 LRRM 2414, at 2415-6 (1960). 
In the companion case, the court held that labor agreements create a 
presumption that disputes are arbitrable, stating "an order to arbitrate the particular 
grievance should not be denied unless it can be said with positive assurance that the 
arbitration clause is not susceptible of an interpretation that covers the asserted 
dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage" United Steelworkers v. 
Warrior and Gulf, 363 U.S. 574, at 582-583 (1960). See also AT&T Technologies, 
Inc. v. Communication Workers, 475 U.S. 643, 650 (1986), and Oil Chemical and 
Atomic Workers International Union Local 5-391 et. al. v. Conoco, Inc., 241 F3d 
1299 (CA10, 2001). 
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The U.S. Department of Labor's policy is also to defer resolving this dispute to 
arbitration. It is noteworthy that the Arrangement, which was drafted by the 
Department of Labor, does not require joint submission on the issues to the arbitrator. { 
Either party may refer disputes to arbitration under Section 8(a) of the Arrangement. 
The Union is not relegated to arbitrating only the UTA's limited definition of the < 
dispute, such as whether or not there was an impasse. 
In view of the presumptions of arbitrability, the district court would have to 
make a very clear finding as to why the Arrangement's arbitration provisions do not 
apply. It did not do so, nor could it because the labor disputes at issue are plainly 
within the scope of the arbitration clause. 
The UTA's contentions before the district court for finding the disputes are not 
subject to arbitration are not persuasive. In its Complaint, UTA contended that the 
issue of impasse in collective bargaining is not subject to arbitration "because it does 
not require the 'application, interpretation, or enforcement' of the 13(c) 
Arrangement..." (R. 4-5). This artful pleading and posturing, takes the word 
"impasse" completely out its collective bargaining context and wrongfully claims it as 
an issue having nothing to with the Arrangement. Good faith collective bargaining 
must take place for there to be a legitimate impasse. 
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UTA's pleading also presumes too much. It declares (without asking the court 
to do so) that z/there was an impasse in bargaining, the UTA could unilaterally change 
conditions of employment. (R. 3). The UTA claims this right notwithstanding the 
Fact-Finding Provision in the Arrangement which was in dispute! The Arrangement 
does not use the terms "if fact-finding is invoked" at paragraph 9(g). (R. 4). To the 
contrary, by virtue of paragraphs 9(a) and (g) of the Arrangement, Arbitrator Axon 
held that the UTA violated the Arrangement when it "imposed the terms and 
conditions for a successor Agreement prior to the invocation of the mandatory fact 
finding process." (See Arbitration Board's Award, page 35 of Exhibit "A" of 
Affidavit of Rodney Dunn). 
For that matter, the word "require" as alleged by the UTA at paragraph 21 of 
the Complaint, is not in the Arrangement. (R.5-6). The Arrangement actually states 
at Section 8(a) that "Any labor disputes .. ..between the Public Body and the Union 
regarding the application, interpretation, or enforcement of the Arrangement..." may 
be arbitrated. (Italics added). 
The alleged unfair labor practices of UTA (including the impasse issue) do in 
fact regard and require application, interpretation and enforcement of the collective 
bargaining rights protected by the Arrangement under paragraph 3, against the 
wrongful declaration of impasse and unilateral implementation of new terms and 
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conditions by the UTA. The district court should have granted the Union's motion to 
compel arbitration of its allegations of bad faith bargaining, including the issue of 
impasse, without hesitation. Instead it denied it for no reason. 
Nor do the Union's bargaining rights have its source only in Utah law, as 
contended by the UTA. As argued above, under Donovan, the Arrangement protects 
federal policies of collective bargaining which give meaning and depth to the state's 
bare bones collective bargaining statute. 
The Arrangement plainly contemplates that disputes over violations of state law 
protecting collective bargaining rights are subject to arbitration. This intention is 
clearly within the four comers of the Arrangement at paragraph 3, and as such is the 
type of labor dispute that is subject to arbitration under paragraph 8(a). The 
arbitration language is unambiguous and as such should be enforced as a matter of 
law. See Dixon v. Pro Image Inc., 87 P.2d 48 (Utah 1999), citing Willard Pease Oil & 
Gas Co. v. Pioneer Oil & Gas Co., 899 P.2d 766, 770 (Utah 1995). 
Utah law explicitly delegates to the Secretary of Labor the determination of the 
''employee protective conditions and remedies of Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass 
Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 5333(b), as determined by the Secretary of 
Labor". U. C. A. § 17B-2a-813(l). (Italics added). It is entirely appropriate that the 
Department of Labor provides for a labor law arbitrator to resolve unfair labor 
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practice disputes under the Arrangement. The arbitrator has the expertise and time 
that the state courts lack to hear these disputes. The UTA, by accepting federal funds, 
in effect waived its right to resort to the state courts to determine the scope of its 
collective bargaining obligation under the Arrangement. 
The United States Supreme Court recently held in 14 Perm Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 
556 U.S. 1456, 129 S. Ct. 1456 (2009) holding that a union waived a bargaining unit 
member's right to file an age discrimination claim in a judicial forum when the 
collective bargaining agreement requires mandatory arbitration of claims under the 
Age Discrimination In Employment Act. Thus, under federal arbitration law, it is 
permissible, for the parties to labor agreements, to stipulate that statutory rights must 
be enforced by arbitration rather than agency or court action. Under the clear 
language of the Arrangement and requirements of Utah arbitration law, the Union's 
allegations of unfair labor practices involving collective bargaining rights must be 
arbitrated rather than litigated before the district court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Court should reverse the decision of the Utah district court, remand and direct it 
to grant the Union's Motion To Compel Arbitration and dismiss the UTA's action. 
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FILED DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judicial District 
SEP e 7 mt 
.SALT LAKE CC 
xJ^pfoOg 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a Utah 




LOCAL 382 OF THE AMALGAMATED 
TRANSIT UNION 
Defendant. 
RULING ON DEFENDANTS' 




PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 100 907 409 
Judge: L.A. DEVER 
This matter came on for hearing on cross motions. The plaintiff was represented 
by Scott A. Hagen, D. Zachary Wiseman and Liesel B. Stevens. The defendant was 
represented by Joseph E. Hatch and Arthur F. Sandack. After considering the 
memoranda of the parties and the arguments presented the Court rules as follows, after 
noting that the following facts are not in dispute and are contained in the memoranda of 
both parties: 
1. Plaintiff Utah Transit Authority (UTA) is a Utah Public Transit District 
with operations in several Utah counties along the Wasatch Front with its headquarters 
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
in Salt Lake County 
2. Defendant Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union (Union) is an 
unincorporated association with its principal office in Salt Lake County. 
3. The Union is the recognized exclusive representative for purposes of 
collective bargaining of certain UTA employees that are described in a series of 
collective bargaining agreements (CBA) between UTA and the Union. 
4. The most recent CBA expired on December 10, 2009, but was. 
extended by agreement of the parties to December 21, 2009. 
5. The parties began negotiations for a successor agreement in August of 
200'9. The parties met approximately fourteen times during this period. 
6. After December 21,1009, UTA declared that an impasse had occurred 
and discontinued negotiations. 
7. Based on the declaration of impasse, UTA implemented changes to the 
employees' terms and conditions of employment and informed the Union of these 
I— *%4-] .—.ft t^ 
CTwiivJliO. 
8. In addition to a CBA, the Union and UTA were and are subject to an 
arrangement pursuant to Section 13(c) of the Urban IVlass Transit Act of 1964 (Section 
13(c) Arrangement), which requires, in general, that public transit agencies that receive 
2 
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federal funds make "protective arrangements" for the benefit of employees. 
9. The 13(c) Arrangement governing UTA and its employees is 
enforceable in State Court and is governed by state law. 
10. Pursuant to the Section 13(c) Arrangement, if "fact finding" is invoked 
by either party the terms of the expired CBA remain in effect until fact-finding is 
completed. 
11. Neither side has invoked fact finding. 
12. The parties do not agree on the application of Section 13(c). The 
Union contends that Paragraph 8 of the Arrangement is a general arbitration obligation. 
UTA claims that it is limited to "application, interpretation, or enforcement of the Section 
13 (c) Arrangement. 
13. The parties have agreed to arbitrate the issue of the application of 
whether Section 13(c) Arrangement, specifically fl (9)(g) of the Arrangement prohibited 
UTA from modifying the terms and conditions of employment on December 21, 2009. 
ISSUES 
Is Arbitration mandated by either the CBA or the Section 13(c) Arrangement? 
1. The CBA between the parties provides for arbitration of disputes under 
3 
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the agreement. Upon the expiration of the CBA the arbitration provision ceased to have 
effect. There existed an opportunity for either side to invoke the fact finding process. If 
such invocation occurred the expired CBA would remain in effect. Neither side invoked 
fact finding. No evidence has been presented on the question of the expiration of the 
time to request fact finding. For the purposes of these motions, an arbitration obligation 
has not been shown to exist. 
2. The Section 13(c) Arrangement does require arbitration. However, the 
arbitration requirement only applies to the application, interpretation, or enforcement of 
the Section 13(c) Arrangement. The position of the Union to broaden the scope of the 
application of the arbitration requirement to the underlying CBA is not well taken. 
The Union cites to the recent case of Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 192, AFL-CiO 
vs Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District, Case No. RG10522627, of the Superior Court 
for the County of Alameda, for the proposition that a Section 13(c) Arrangement 
requires arbitration. Although that case has substantial similarity in facts to the instant 
case, the Superior Court was asked to issue a Preliminary Injunction to maintain the 
status quo pending arbitration. That arbitration had previously been ordered by the 
Court. Those are not the facts of this case. 
4 
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Does this Court have Jurisdiction to Address the Actions of UTA? 
Utah Code 17B-2a-813 provides that the District Court is empowered to decide 
whether or not UTA violated Utah labor laws, failed to bargain in good faith or is subject 
to an arbitration obligation under a CBA. The Federal provisions contained in the 
Section 13(c) Arrangement have been clearly determined not to supersede state law but 
are tools to protect the collective bargaining rights of the workers. See Jackson Transit 
Auth. V. Local Division 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15 (1982). 
CONCLUSION 
The Defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration pursuant to Section 13(c) 
Arrangement of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964 is denied. • The Motion to 
Stay Judicial Proceeding being tied to the granting of the Motion to Compel Arbitration 
is therefore also denied. 
The Plaintiff in its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is not asking whether 
UTA violated Utah law in implementing changed terms and conditions. The answer to 
this requires deciding factual issues: whether there was bargaining in good faith, 
whether the impasse concept was properly invoked and whether the invoking of fact-
finding is still viable. 
5 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
1 
( 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is on the issue of who has 
jurisdiction to determine if UTA violated Utah Law. This Court concludes that it is the < 
Judicial System that has that authority, not a third party arbitrator. 
This stands as the Final Order of the Court. 
DATED AND SIGNED this ^  day of September, 2010. 
6 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Ruling was mailed 
the 8th day of September, 2010, to the following: 
Joseph E. Hatch 
5295 South Commerce Drive, Ste 200 
Murray, UT 84107 
Arthur F. Sandack 
8 East Broadway, Ste 411 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Scott A. Hagen 
D. Zachary Wiseman 
Liesel B. Stevens 
RAY QUINNEY & NEBEKER, P.C. 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385 
0 j 
Deputy Court Cle<k) 
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SCOTT A. HAGEN (4840) 
D. ZACHARY WISEMAN (8316) 
DAVID B. DIBBLE (10222) 
RAY QUTNNEY & NEBEKER P.C. 
36 South State Street, Suite 1400 
P.O. Box 45385 





Attorneys for Defendant Utah Transit Authority 
m THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY, a Utah 
public transit district, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
LOCAL 382 OF THE AMALGAMATED 
TRANSIT UNION, 
Defendant. i 
AMENDED RULING ON 
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO COMPEL 
ARBITRATION AND PLAINTIFF'S 
! MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 100907409 
Judge L. A. Dever 
This matter came on for hearing on cross motions. The plaintiff was represented by Scott 
A. Hagen, D. Zachary Wiseman and Liesel B. Stevens. The defendant was represented by 
Joseph E. Hatch and Arthur F. Sandack. After considering the memoranda of the parties and the 
ai'guments presented, the Court rules as follows, after noting that the following facts are not in 
dispute and are contained in the memoranda of both parties: 
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1. Plaintiff Utah Transit Authority ("UTA53) is a Utah Public Transit District with 
operations in several Utah counties along the Wasatch Front with its headquarters in Salt Lake 
County. 
2. • Defendant Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union ("Union") is an 
unincorporated association with its principal office in Salt Lake County. 
3. The Union is the recognized exclusive representative for purposes of collective 
bargaining of certain UTA employees that are described in a series of collective bargaining 
agreements ("CB A") between UTA and the Union. 
4. The most recent CBA expired on December 10, 2009, but was extended by 
agreement of the parties to December 21, 2009. 
5. The parties began negotiations for a successor agreement in August of 2009. The 
parties met approximately fourteen times during this period. 
6. After December 21, 2009, UTA declared that an impasse had occurred and 
discontinued negotiations. 
7. Based on the declaration of impasse, UTA implemented changes to the 
employees' terms and conditions of employment and informed the Union of these actions. 
8. In addition to a CBA, the Union and UTA were and are subject to an arrangement 
pursuant to Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transit Act of 1964 (Section 13(c) Arrangement), 
which requires, in general, that public transit agencies that receive federal funds make 
"protective arrangements" for the benefit of employees. 
9. The 13(c) Arrangement governing UTA and its employees is enforceable in State 
Court and is governed by state law. 
n 
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10. Pursuant to the Section 13(c) Arrangement, if fact-finding is invoked by either 
party the terms of the expired CBA remain in effect until fact-finding is completed. 
11. Neither side has invoked fact finding. 
12. The parties do not agree on the application of Section 13(c). The Union contends 
that Paragraph 8 of the Arrangement is aldn to a general arbitration obligation. The parties agree 
that the arbitration obligation is limited to the "application, interpretation, or enforcement" of the 
Section 13(c) Arrangement, but they disagree as to the limitations imposed by that language. 
13. The parties have agreed to arbitrate the issue of the application of whether Section 
13(c) Arrangement, specifically f (9)(g) of the Arrangement prohibited UTA from modifying the 
terms and conditions of employment on December 21, 2009. 
ISSUES 
Is Arbitration mandated by the Section 13(c) Arrangement? 
The Section 13(c) Arrangement does require arbitration. However, the arbitration 
requirement only applies to the application, interpretation, or enforcement of the Section 13(c) 
Arrangement. The Union cites to the recent case of Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 192, 
AFL-CIO vs. Alameda-Contra Costa Transit District, Case No. RG10522627, of the Superior 
Court for the County of Alameda, for the proposition that a Section 13(c) Arrangement requires 
arbitration. Although that case has substantial similarity in facts to the instant case, the Superior 
Court was asked to issue a Preliminary Injunction to maintain the status quo pending arbitration. 
That arbitration had previously been ordered by the Court. Those are not the facts of this case. 
Does this Court have Jurisdiction to Address the Actions of UTA? 
n 
J 
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Utah Code 17B-2a-813 provides that the District Court is empowered to decide whether 
or not UTA violated Utah labor laws, failed to bargain in good faith or is subject to an arbitration 
obligation under a CBA. The Federal provisions contained in the Section 13(c) Arrangement 
have been clearly determined not to supersede state law but are tools to protect the collective 
bargaining rights of the workers. See Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Division 1285, 
Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15 (1982). 
CONCLUSION 
The Plaintiff in its Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is not asking whether UTA 
violated Utah law in implementing changed terms and conditions. The answer to this requires 
deciding factual issues: whether there was bargaining in good faith, whether the impasse concept 
was properly invoked and whether the invoicing of fact-finding is still viable. 
Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is on the issue of who has jurisdiction 
to determine if UTA violated Utah Law. This Court concludes that it is Judicial System that has 
that authority, not a third party arbitrator. 
This stands as the Final Order of the Court. 
DATED this ^T day of November, 2010. 
BY THE COURT: 
\y \ 
L. X! Devel: 
District Judge 
Approved as to form: 
,yWs 
Joseph E. Hatch, Esq. 
Attorney for the Union 
4 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing AMENDED RULING ON 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO COMPEL ARBITRATION AND PLAINTIFF'S MOTION 
FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed the day of November, 2010, to the 
following: 
Joseph E. Hatch, Esq. 
5295 South Commerce Drive, Suite 200 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Arthur F. Sandack 
8 East Broadway, Suite 411 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
1105706 
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Saptembar 23, 1953 
A??22DII "a" 
Protective Arangement Pursuant to Section 13(c) 
of the Federal Transit Act. 
(a) The Project shall be carried out in full 
compliance with the protective conditions 
described herein and in such a manner and upon 
such terms and conditions as will not adversely 
affect employees represented by Local 382, 
Amalgamated Transit Union, AFL-CIO ("Union") . 
(b) Subparagraph (a) is intended to express the 
general requirement that the rights and 
interests of employees represented by the Union 
be protected from the effects of the Project. 
Initially, this means that the Utah Transit 
Authority ("Public Body") in designing and 
implementing the Project must consider /the 
effects the Project may have on employees 
represented by the Union and attempt to 
minimize any adverse effects as a result of the 
Project. If objectives can be met without 
adversely effecting such employees as a result 
of the project, it is expected that adverse 
effects as a result of the project will be 
avoided. The duty to minimize adverse effects 
as a result of the project is not intended to 
preclude all actions which would adversely 
affect employees, but to balance such actions 
in favor of the interests of employees. In the 
context of particular Project events, this 
paragraph is to be read in conjunction with 
other provisions of this Arrangement. It 
thereby is intended to emphasize the specific 
statutory requirements that the employees be 
protected against a worsening of their 
employment conditions as a result of the 
Project and receive offsetting benefits to make 
them "whole" when unavoidable adverse effects 
occur as a result of the project. 
All rights, privileges, and benefits (including 
pension rights and benefits) of employees 
represented by'the Union (including employees 
having already retired) under existing 
collective bargaining agreements or otherwise, 
or under any revision or renewal thereof, shall 
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be preserved and continued provided, however, 
that such rights, privileges and benefits not 
previously vestad may be modified by collective 
bargaining and agreement of the Pyblic Body or 
'other operator of the transit'system and the 
Union to substitute other rights, privileges 
and benefits. 
The collective bargaining rights of employees 
represented by the Union including the right to 
arbitrate or otherwise resolve labor disputes 
and to maintain checkoff arrangements, as 
"provided by applicable laws, policies and/or 
existing collective bargaining agreements shall 
be preserved and continued; provided, however, 
that this provision shall not be interpreted so 
as to require the Public Body to retain any 
such rights which exist by virtue of a 
collective bargaining agreement after-such 
agreement is no longer in effect, except (a) as 
may otherwise by required under Federal labor 
policy with respect to the arbitration of 
grievances arising under such agreement, or (b) 
as may be required under applicable law, 
including Section 13(c) of the Act, or (c) as 
may be required under paragraph (9) of this 
Arrangement. . The Public body agrees that it 
will bargain collectively with the Union or 
otherwise arrange for the continuation of 
collective bargaining, and that it will enter 
into agreements with the Union or arrange for 
such agreements to be entered into,' relative to 
all subjects which are or. may be proper 
subjects- of collective bargaining. 
Any employee represented by the Union who is 
laid off or otherwise deprived of employment or 
placed in a worse position with respect to 
compensation at any time during his or her 
employment as a result of the Project, 
including any program of efficiencies or 
economies directly or indirectly related 
thereto, shall be entitled to receive any 
applicable rights, privileges and benefits as 
specified in the employee protective 
arrangements attached hereto and made a part 
hereof as Exhibit "A"; provided, however, that 
nothing in Exhibit "A" shall be deemed to 
supersede or displace any other provisions of 
this arrangement, and in the event of any 
conflict or inconsistency between them, the 
other provisions of this Arrangement shall 
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control. Any employee represented by the Union 
who is placed in a worse position with respect 
to hours, working conditions, fringe benefits, 
or rights and privileges pertaining thereto at 
any time during his or her employment as a 
result of the project shall be made whole. 
Arbitrators' awards must wholly compensate 
employees for the harm they suffer, but this 
does not necessarily or strictly require in all 
circumstances the restitution of the precise 
benefit, right or privilege lost or adversely 
affected as a result of the Project, 
Reasonable efforts shall first be made to provide 
restitution of the precise benefit, right or 
privilege lost or adversely affected as a 
result of the project. If such efforts are 
unseuccessful or would be unsuitable, an 
alternative remedy, awarding-either 1) 
offsetting benefits where such an award would 
result in a fair and equitable substitute or 2) 
compensatory damages where the harm has a 
readily ascertainable economic value and such 
an alternative remedy is fair and equitable, 
may be acceptable. 
(5) (a) The Public Body shall be financially 
responsible for the application of these 
conditions and will make the necessary 
arrangements so that any employee who is 
affected as a result of the Project may file a 
claim with the Public Body within sixty (60) 
days of the date the employee is terminated or 
laid off as a result of the Project, or within 
eighteen (18) months of the date the employee's 
position with respect to the employee's 
employment is otherwise worsened as a result of 
the Project; provided, in the latter case, if 
the events giving rise to the claim have 
occurred over an extended period, the 13-month 
limitation shall be measured from the last such 
event; provided, further, that no benefits 
shall be payable for any period prior to six 
(6) months from the date of the filing of the 
claim. Unless such a claim is filed with the 
Public Body within such time limitations, the 
Public Body shall thereafter be relieved of all 
liabilities and obligations related to such 
claim. 
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(b) In the case of a claim filed under this 
paragraph, the Public Body will either fully 
honor the claim, making appropriate payments, 
or will give notice to the claimant and the 
Union of the basis for denying or modifying 
such claiin, giving reasons therefor. In the 
event the Public Body fails to honor such 
claim,' the Union may invoke the following 
procedures for further joint investigation of 
the claim by giving notice of its desire to 
pursue such procedures. Within ten (.10) days 
from the receipt by the Public Body of such 
notice, the parties shall exchange such factual 
information as may be available to them 
relevant to the disposition of the claim and 
shall jointly take such steps as may be 
necessary or desirable to obtain from any third 
parties such additional factual material as may 
be relevant. As soon as practicable 
thereafter, the parties shall meet and attempt 
to agree upon the proper disposition of the 
claim. If no such agreement is reached, and 
the Public Body decides to reject the claim, it 
shall give written notice of its final 
rejection of the claim, detailing- its reasons 
therefor. In the event the claim is so 
rejected by the Public Body, the claim may be 
processed to arbitration as provided by 
paragraph (3) of this Arrangement. Prior to 
the arbitration hearing the parties shall 
exchange a list of intended witnesses. In 
conjunction with such proceedings, the board of 
arbitration shall have the power to subpoena 
witnesses upon the request of any party and to 
compel the production of documents and other 
information denied in the pre-arbitration 
period which is relevant to the disposition of 
the claim. 
(a) During the employee's protective period, as 
defined in Exhibit "A", any employee who has 
been laid off or otherwise deprived of 
employment as a result of the Project shall be 
granted, if such employee requests in writing, 
priority of employment or remployment to fill 
any vacant position on the transit system 
reasonably comparable to that which the 
employee held when dismissed for which the 
employee is, or by training or re-training for 
a reasonable period can become, qualified; not, 
however, in contravention o.f collective 
bargaining agreements related thereto. In the 
v^ 
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event training or ra-training is required by 
such employment"or reemployment, the Public 
Body or other operator of the transit system 
shall provide or provide for such training or 
re-training at no cost to the employee, and 
such employee shall be paid, while training or 
re-training, the salary or hourly rate provided 
for in the applicable collective bargaining 
agreement for such position, plus any 
displacement allowance to which the employee 
may be otherwise entitled. If a dismissed 
employee who has made such request fails, 
without good cause, within ten (10) days to 
accept an offer of a position comparable to 
that held when dismissed, for which the 
employee is qualified or for which the employee 
has satisfactorily completed such training, the 
employee shall, effective at the expiration of 
such 10-day period, forfeit all rights and . 
benefits under this Arrangement. 
(b) As between employees who request employment 
pursuant to this paragraph, the following order 
where applicable shall prevail in hiring such 
employees: 
(i) . Employees in the craft or class of the 
vacancy shall be given priority over 
employees without seniority in such craft 
or class; 
(ii) As between employees having seniority in 
the craft or class of the vacancy, the 
senior employees, based upon their service 
in that craft or class, as shown on the 
appropriate seniority roster, shall 
prevail over junior employees; 
(iii) As between employees not having seniority 
in the craft cr class of the vacancy, the 
senior employees, based upon their service 
• in the crafts or classes in which they do 
have seniority, as shown on the 
appropriate seniority rosters, shall 
prevail over junior employees. 
(a) In the event the Public Body contemplates any 
change in the organization or operation of its 
system which may result in the dismissal or 
displacement of employees,.or rearrangement of 
the working forces represented by the union, as 
a result of the Project, the Public Body shall 
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do so only in accordance with the provisions of 
subparagraph (b) hereof. Provided, however, 
that changes which are not a result of.ttje 
project, but which grow out of the normal 
exercise of seniority rights occasioned by 
seasonal or other normal schedule changes and 
regular picking procedures under the applicable 
collective bargaining agreement, shall not be 
considered within the purview of this 
paragraph. 
(b) The Public 3cdy shall give the Union at least 
sixty (50) days written.notice of each proposed 
change which may result in the dismissal or 
displacement of such employees or rearrangement 
of the working forces as a result of the 
Project, by sending certified mail notice to 
the Union. Such notice shall contain a full and 
adequate statement- of the proposed changes, 
including an estimate of the number of 
employees of each classification affected by 
intended changes and the number and 
classifications of any jobs in the Public 
Body's £mployment available to be filled by 
such affected employees. At the request of 
either the Public Body or the Union, 
negotiations for the purpose of reaching an 
agreement with respect to the application of 
the terms and conditions of this Arrangement 
shall commence immediately. These negotiations 
shall include determining the selection of 
forces from among the urban mass transportation 
employees who may be affected as a result of 
the Project, to establish which such employees 
shall be offered employment with the Public 
Body for which they*are qualified or .can be 
trained; not, however, in contravention of 
collective bargaining agreements relating 
thereto, and any assignment of employees 
represented by the Union made necessary by the 
intended changes shall be made on the basis of 
an agreement between the Public body and the 
Union. If no agreement is reached within 
twenty (20) days from the commencement of 
negotiations, either party may submit it to 
arbitration in accordance with procedures 
contained in paragraph (8) hereof. The 
Authority of the arbitrator shall be limited to 
the determination of the dispute regarding the 
application of the terms and conditions of this 
Arrangement to the intended change. In any 
such arbitration, the terms of this Arrangement 
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are to be interpreted and applied in favor of 
providing employee protections and benefits no 
less than those established pursuant to Section 
5(2) (f) of the Interstate Commerce Act, 
currently codified at 49 U.S.C. 11347. 
(a) Any labor dispute or controversy between the 
Public Body and any employee represented by the 
Union or between the Public Body and the tlnion, 
regarding the application,.interpretation, or 
enforcement of this Arrangement, which cannot 
be settled by the parties within thirty (30) 
days after the dispute or controversy first 
arises, may be submitted at the written request 
of either the Public Body or the Union to a 
beard of arbitration to be selected as 
hereinafter provided. 
(b) The Public Body and the Union shall each, 
within five (5) days after a request under 
subparagraph (a), select one member of the 
arbitration board and the two members thus 
chosen shall select a third member who shall 
serve as chairman. If either party fails to 
select its member within the prescribed time 
limit, the highest officer of the Union, on the 
one hand, or of the Public Body on the other, 
or their nominees, as case may be, shall be 
deemed to be the selected member, and the board 
of arbitration shall then function and its 
decision shall have the same force and effect 
as though the parties had selected 'their 
members. Should the two members be unable to 
agree upon the appointment of the neutral 
member within ten (10) days, either may request 
the American Arbitration Association to furnish 
a list of (5) persons from which the neutral 
member shall be selected. The two members 
selected by the parties shall, within seven (7) 
• . days after the receipt of such list, determine 
by lot the order of elimination, and thereafter 
each shall, in that order, alternately 
eliminate one name until only one name remains. 
The remaining person on the list shall be the 
neutral member. 
(c) The board-of arbitration shall render its 
decision within forty-five (45) days after the 
date of the close of the hearing. The decision 
shall be by majority vote of the arbitration 
board and shall be final, binding and 
conclusive. 
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(d) The board of arbitration shall have no 
authority to £dd to, delete from, or change the 
terms of this Arrangement. The fees and 
expenses^of the neutral member, as well as any 
other joint expenses incidental to the 
arbitration, shall be borne equally by the 
parties, and all other expenses shall be paid 
by the party incurring them. 
(e) In the event of any disputa as to whether or 
not a particular employee was affected by the 
Project, it shall be the employee's obligation 
to identify the Project and specify the 
pertinent facts relied upon.. It shall then be 
the burden of the Public Body to prove that 
factors other than the Project affected the 
employee. The claiming employee shall prevail 
if it is established that the Project had an 
effect upon the employee even if other factors 
may also have affected the employee. 
(9) (a) Any labor dispute between the Public Body and 
the Union regarding the making or maintaining 
of a collective bargaining agreement, or the 
wages, hours, working conditions, or other 
terms to be included in such an agreement, 
which cannot be settled by the parties within 
sixty (50) days after the dispute first arises 
may be submitted at the written request of 
either such party to fact finding in accordance 
with this paragraph. 
(b) Upon a written request for fact finding, the 
Public Body and the Union shall meet and 
attempt to agree on an acceptable neutral fact 
finder. If the parties are unable to agree on 
a neutral fact finder within ten (10) days 
after the request for fact finding, either 
•party may request the Federal Mediation and 
Conciliation Service to furnish a list of five 
(5) persons from which the neutral fact finder 
shall be selected. The request shall specify a 
preference for neutral fact finders experienced 
in matters of transportation and public sector 
interest disputes, and having a place of 
business in one of the following States: 
Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Utah or Wyoming. The 
parties shall, within seven (7) days after 
receipt of such list, determine by lot the 
order of elimination, and thereafter each 
-v& 
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shall, in that order, alternatively eliminate 
one name until only one name remains. The 
remaining person on the list shall be the 
neutral fact finder. 
In connection with a factfinding proceeding 
under this paragraph; the Public Body and the 
Union shall exchange such factual information 
as may be available to them, reasonable in 
nature and scope, and relevant to the issues 
presented. The parties agree that no such 
relevant information shall be withheld. In 
conjunction with such proceedings, the neutral 
factfinder shall have the power to compel the 
production of documents and other information 
denied in the pre-factfinding period which is 
relevant to the disposition of the issues, and 
to adjust the time frames for this factfinding 
procedure to allow for the receipt and review 
of such information. 
In making findings of fact and recommendations 
for the resolution of the matters in dispute 
the neutral fact finder shall take into 
consideration the following factors: 
(1) The stipulations of the parties; 
(2) The financial conditions of the transit 
system, the ability of the Public Body to 
administer and finance the existing 
system, and the interest and welfare of 
the public; 
(3) A comparison of the wages, hours, and 
terms and conditions of employment of the 
Public Body's employees with those of 
other public and private employees doing 
comparable work giving consideration to 
factors peculiar to the community or area 
and the job classification involved; 
(4) The overall compensation presently 
received by the Public Body's employees, 
including wages, hours, and terms and 
conditions of employment, and all medical, 
insurance, pension, and fringe benefits 
received; 
(5) Collective bargaining agreements between 
the parties; and 
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(5) Such other factors not confined to those 
noted above which are normally and 
traditionally taken into consideration in 
determination of issues submitted to 
mutually agreed upon dispute settlement 
procedures in public service or private 
employment. 
(e) Each party shall within five (5) days of the 
selection of the neutral fact finder submit to 
the other party and the neutral fact finder a 
listing of unresolved issues and its position 
on the identified issues. The neutral fact 
finder shall hold hearings and receive oral or 
written testimony as appropriate. Except as 
provided in subsection (c), the neutral fact 
finder shall issue findings of fact ar.d 
recommendations for resolution of the issues in 
dispute within forty-five (45) days after the 
submission of the listing of issues to the 
neutral fact finder. Except as provided in 
subsection (f), the recommendations of the fact 
finder shall be advisory only and shall not be 
binding on either party. 
(f) Each party shall notify the neutral fact finder 
and the other party to the dispute whether it 
accepts the recommendations, in whole or in 
part, within fifteen (15) days of the issuance 
of such recommendations. If neither party 
rejects the recommendations for resolution of 
the issues in dispute, such recommendations 
shall be deemed to be a final resolution'of the 
matters in dispute. If a party does reject 
such recommendations, it shall include in its 
notification its specific reasons for rejection 
in writing. Within two (2) days after the 
receipt of a rejection by either party, the 
neutral fact finder shall release for 
publication in the local media his or her 
findings of fact, recommendations for 
settlement, the positions of the parties, and 
the reasons of the parties for rejection of the 
fact finder's recommendations. 
(g) The terms and conditions of any expiring 
collective bargaining agreement between the 
parties shall remain in place following 
expiration of such agreement, unless otherwise 
mutually agreed in writing by the parties, 
until the conclusion of the fact finding 
proceedings. The time limitations included in 
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this paragraph may be extended by mutual 
written agreement of the parties. The fees and 
expenses of the neutral fact finder, as well as 
any other joint expenses incidental to the fact 
finding, shall be borne equally by the parties, 
and all other expenses shall be paid by the 
party incurring them. 
Nothing in this Arrangement shall be construed 
as depriving any employee of any rights or 
benefits which such employee may have under any 
existing job security or other protective 
conditions or arrangements by collective 
bargaining agreement or law where applicable'; 
provided that there shall be no duplication or 
pyramiding of benefits to any employees, and, 
provided further, trat any benefit under"this 
Arrangement, shall be construed to-
include the conditions, responsibilities, and 
obligations accompanying such benefit. This 
paragraph is intended to be construed 
consistent with the Hodgson Affidavit in 
Congress of Railway Unions v. Hodason, 32 6 
F.Supp. 68 (D.D.C. 1971), and the Federal 
court's interpretation of the concept of 
"pyramiding" in New York Dock Railway v. U.S., 
609 F..2d 83, 100-101 (2d Cir. 1979). 
The term "Project", as used in this Arrangement 
shall not be limited to the particular 
facility, service, or operation assisted by 
Federal funds, but shall include any changes, 
whether organizational, operational, 
technological, or otherwise, which are a result 
of the assistance provided. 
The phrase "as a result of the Project", as 
used in this Arrangement, shall include events 
occuring in anticipation of, during, and 
subsequent to the Project and any program of 
efficiencies or economies related thereto; 
provided, however, that volume rises and falls 
of business, or changes in volume and character 
of employment brought about by causes other 
than the Project (including any economies or 
efficiencies unrelated to the Project) are not 
within the purview of this Arrangement. 
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(c) Except as otherwise provided in paragraph 
(6)(a) of Exhibit "A", the term "days", as used 
•in this Arrangement, shall mean calendar days. 
(12) This Arrangement shall be binding upon the 
successors and assigns of the parties hereto, 
and no provisions, terms or obligations herein 
contained shall be affected, modified, altered, 
or changed in any respect whatsoever by reason 
of the arrangements made by or for the Public 
Body to manage or operate the system. Any 
person, enterprise, body, or agency, whether 
publicly or privately owned, which shall 
undertake the management or operation of the 
transit system shall agree to be bound by the 
terms of this Arrangement and accept the 
responsibility for full performance of these 
conditions. 
(13) Tie employees represented by the. Union shall 
continue to receive coverage under Social 
Security, Workmen's Compensation, unemployment 
compensation, and the like. In no event shall 
these benefits be worsened as a result of the 
Project. 
(14) In the event any provision of this Arrangement 
is held to be invalid or otherwise 
unenforceable under the Federal, State or local 
law, the remaining provisions of this 
Arrangement shall not be affected and the 
invalid or unenforceable provisions shall be 
re-negotiated for purpose of adequate 
replacement under Section 13(c) of the Act. If 
such negotiation shall be result in mutually 
satisfactory agreement, either party may invoke 
the jurisdiction of the Secretary of Labor to 
determine substitute fair and equitable 
employee protective arrangements for 
application only to the particular Project, 
which shall be incorporated in this Arrangement 
only as applied to that Project, and any other 
appropriate action, remedy, or relief. 
(15) If this Project is approved for assistance 
under the Act, the foregoing terms and 
conditions shall be made part of the contract 
of assistance between the Federal Government 
and the applicant for Federal funds, provided, 
however, that these arrangements shall not 
merge into the contract of assistance, but 
shall be independently binding and enforceable 
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by and upon the parties, in accordance with its 
terms; nor shall the collective bargaining 
agreement merge into this Arrangement, but each 
shall be independently binding and enforceable 
by and upon the parties, in accordance with its 
terms. 
A] Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
